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Child Soldiers and the Capacity of the Optional Protocol to
Protect Children in Conflict
by Shara Abraham*

© Amnesty International

I

n recent years a body of international norms and standards
for protecting children affected by armed conflict has
emerged. Of particular importance is the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional
Protocol), which entered into force on February 12, 2002. The
Optional Protocol sets 18 as the minimum age for compulsory military recruitment. It also requires that states mandate
a minimum age, never less than 15, at which they will accept
voluntary military recruits.
Although the enactment of the Optional Protocol is a laudable achievement, it is abundantly clear that child soldiers
continue to be employed at increasingly alarming rates.
One statistic illustrates the depth to which armed conflict continues to deleteriously affect children: more than 300,000 children under 18 are engaged in conflict, serving as combatants
in nearly 75 percent of the conflicts around the globe. While
protracted conflicts ensue from Asia to South America,
potential conflicts loom on the horizon as well. Such conflicts
test the capacity of the Optional Protocol to protect children
in conflict and serve as reminders that the enactment of international instruments alone has not stopped the aggressive
mobilization of the world’s youngest and most vulnerable
population.
The most effective means of ending this offensive practice
is a multi-faceted approach. Governments, international
agencies, and local actors must continue to pressure armed
forces to stop recruiting and deploying child soldiers. Human
Rights Watch recently noted that several armed opposition
groups in Burma appear to be responding to such pressure.
It also is important to curb the easy availability of small arms
and military aid, both of which facilitate the use of child soldiers. Additionally, it is critical to reduce the risk of child
recruitment. Governments should regularize recruitment
procedures and prosecute those who violate rules precluding
underage recruitment. Educating parents and local communities about national and international law strengthens
their capacity for advocacy, protection, and monitoring, thus
potentially minimizing the risk of recruitment. Further, child
soldiers often are products of impoverished and desperate
socio-political environments. Addressing these root causes is
another key component of reducing the risk of recruitment.
Additionally, demobilization and rehabilitation programming is important. The establishment of peace creates
an opportunity for war-torn states to begin directing energy
and resources toward the victims of conflict. Peace agreements
thus ought to include specific measures pertaining to the
demobilization and reintegration of children, including the
creation of jobs for youth and rebuilding schools and local
communities. As the tenable peace in post-conflict Sierra
Leone demonstrates, developing a protective environment for
demobilized child soldiers and laying the groundwork for
reunification is important. Absent meaningful and effective
implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programming, post-conflict situations could once
again degenerate into conflict.

Drawing by a former child soldier in Sierra Leone.

From Impressionable Youth to Ruthless Killer:
The Phenomenon of the Child Soldier
Across each continent countless states are submerged in
conflict. In armed conflicts from Sierra Leone to Burma to
Colombia, fighting between government forces and nonstate armed groups has led to the destruction of entire communities. Murder, rape, and torture of the local population
are the predominant tactics that government and opposition
groups employ to strike terror and maintain power. The
aggressive recruitment of child soldiers enables such campaigns of terror around the world. Government and rebel
forces abduct and forcibly conscript children, violently quashing their innocence and transforming them into fighters
and sex slaves.
Abducted and forcibly recruited by armed forces, children in armed conflicts suffer two-fold as both witnesses to
atrocities and perpetrators of unspeakable crimes. Many
child soldiers fight on the front lines; others are used as
spies, messengers, and servants. For young girls, recruitment
leads to particularly atrocious suffering. Young girls often are
employed as sexual slaves and are subject to rape, sexual
abuse, and sexual harassment.
Child soldiers are appealing to armed forces for various
reasons, including the fact that children are easy to arm and
control. Children are easy to manipulate because they are
continued on next page
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obedient and unlikely to question orders. As the Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers notes, governments and armed
groups use children because they are “easier to condition into
fearless killing and unthinking obedience.” Armed forces
consider children to be useful soldiers because of the ability
to arm children with newly developed lightweight and easy
to fire weapons. Also, armed forces frequently assign children
to a fatally dangerous task because of their size and agility: the
laying and clearing of landmines.
Armed forces employ countless tactics to turn young children into murderers. Drugs and alcohol are forced upon children to dull their sensitivity to pain. In all too many conflicts,
sheer terror and a desperate struggle to survive lead children
to war. This practice of brutalizing children and transforming them into hardened killers creates a moral and political
dilemma for states in conflict with regimes that employ child
soldiers. Conflict with such regimes requires a state to simultaneously condemn the use of child soldiers as a violation of
international law, yet remain aware of the threat they pose.

International Legal Mechanisms
International Labor Organization Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour was adopted in
June 1999 and was the first international legal instrument to
legally recognize child soldiering as a form of labor. In fact,
the convention deems child soldiering to be one of the worst
forms of child labor. Article 3(a) specifically states that the
worst forms of child labor include “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as . . . forced or compulsory
labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict.” Convention 182 is also the
first international treaty to set 18 as the minimum age for military participation.
Convention 182 precipitated the development of a body
of international norms and standards for protecting children affected by armed conflict. As Secretary-General Kofi
Annan noted during a recent Security Council meeting on
children and armed conflict, on January 23, 2003, there is
growing evidence of an increased international commitment
to the protection of children and child soldiers. Secretary-General Annan emphasized the importance of two landmark
instruments — the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflicts — both of which entered into
force this past year and significantly strengthen existing protections for children in armed conflict.
The Rome Statute defines the use of child soldiers under
15 as a war crime. Consistent with this definition, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the war crime
of conscripting or enlisting children under 15 into national
armed forces or armed groups and of using children as active
participants in hostilities. Additionally, the Rome Statute
contains an expansive definition of “participation in hostilities.” The statute explains that “use of children in a direct support function such as acting as bearers to take supplies to the
front line, or activities at the front line itself, would be
included within the terminology.”
The Optional Protocol, which has been signed by over 100
countries and ratified by more than 40, presents perhaps
the most useful tool for combating the employment of chil16

dren in warfare. This landmark instrument represents universal opposition to the harmful impact of armed conflict on
children. The underlying Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Convention) generally defines a child as any person
under the age of 18, yet sets 15 as the minimum age for military recruitment and participation in armed conflict. The
Optional Protocol amends the Convention by making 18
the minimum age for conscription. This change is significant
because it marks a shift in international opinion regarding the
age at which it is acceptable to conscript children.
The first three articles concern direct participation in
hostilities, compulsory recruitment, and voluntary recruitment, respectively. Article 1 stipulates that states parties “shall
take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their
armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not
take a direct part in hostilities.” Article 2 requires states parties to ensure that persons who are under 18 are not compulsorily recruited into the armed forces. Article 3 has been
lauded as a particularly significant achievement. This provision that states parties raise the minimum age for the voluntary
recruitment of persons into their armed forces from that set
out in the Convention. The second paragraph of this article
authorizes states parties to determine the minimum age at
which it will permit voluntary recruitment into its armed
forces. Where a state party permits voluntary recruitment
under the age of 18, states must comply with the following
minimum safeguards as set forth in Article 3, paragraph
3(a): (1) recruitment must be genuinely voluntary; (2) recruitment must be conducted with the informed consent of the
person’s parents or legal guardians; (3) recruits must be
fully informed of military duties; and (4) recruits must provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national
military service.
The fourth and fifth articles of the Optional Protocol pertain to non-state armed groups and establish a framework for
holding non-state armed groups accountable for child soldiering. Article 4 explicitly states that “armed groups that are
distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under
any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under
the age of 18 years.” The Optional Protocol further provides
that application of its principles is not contingent on the existence of an armed conflict, rendering questions as to whether
a situation amounts to an armed conflict irrelevant. Perhaps
most importantly, the Optional Protocol requires all states parties to endeavor to prevent the recruitment and use of children under 18, rather than limiting this obligation to parties
involved in a particular conflict.
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The Optional Protocol also addresses post-conflict issues,
including demobilization of child soldiers. Article 6 provides
that persons “recruited or used in hostilities” are to be demobilized and accorded “all appropriate assistance for their
physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.” Notably, the language makes clear that children voluntarily or forcibly recruited into armed groups, as well as nonstate forces, are to be included in demobilization and
reintegration efforts.

Assessing the Optional Protocol

dren under 18. Additionally, the Optional Protocol fails to
delineate a means for encouraging adherence on the part of
non-state groups. Non-state groups did not participate in
crafting the content of the statute, potentially rendering it difficult to persuade their adherence. Finally, there is a glaring
absence of monitoring, verification, and enforcement provisions. The absence of such critical components inevitably
will hinder the Optional Protocol’s implementation.
The United States Congress has conducted its own preliminary assessment of the Optional Protocol. The Congressional Human Rights Caucus of the United States Senate
recently sponsored a briefing on child soldiers. The purpose
of the briefing was to highlight the continuing plight of children in armed conflict and address implementation and
enforcement of the Optional Protocol. The briefing focused
on countries that have been submerged in conflict for years,
in some instances even decades, highlighting Burma, Cambodia, and Uganda as the most egregious cases of the use of
child soldiers. As the various speakers at the briefing demonstrated, the pervasive use of child soldiers continues unabated
in spite of the ratification of the Optional Protocol and
increasingly unified international opposition.

During the Optional Protocol’s brief existence it has been
both lauded and criticized. As Casey Kelson, coordinator of
the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, recently
remarked, “This first anniversary of the Optional Protocol
should not be a celebration but a time to call upon other countries to join the international community in condemning
this appalling practice.”
In an article entitled, “Children in Conflict: Assessing the
Optional Protocol,” Center for Defense Information senior
analyst Rachel Stohl articulated five strengths of the Optional
The Role of the Optional Protocol in Protracted Conflicts:
Protocol: (1) it establishes an international standard for the
Burma
employment of children in conflict; (2) it codifies a legal norm
To assess the potential effectiveness of the Optional Proby which states can be held accountable; (3) it sets a minimum
tocol, it is useful to consider it in the context of protracted
age requirement that makes it more difficult for governconflicts, such as the internal conflict in Burma. Protracted
ments and non-state actors to fabriconflicts like Burma underscore the
cate the ages of children employed in
shortcomings of the Optional Proarmed conflict; (4) it encourages
tocol. The State Peace and Develstates to implement existing national
Following recruitment, Burmese child
opment Council (SPDC), Burma’s
laws and policies or enact domestic
military government, crushed prosoldiers, some as young as 11, are
standards that will reflect the standemocracy demonstrations in 1988.
subject to beatings during training,
dards enunciated in the statute; and
Following this victory over democ(5) it raises public awareness regardracy, the military government immeforced to commit human rights abuses
ing the use of child soldiers.
diately directed energy toward buildagainst civilians, and prohibited from
The Optional Protocol is not, howing its armed forces, capitalizing on
ever, flawless. As Stohl concedes, “The
contacting their families.
the nation’s youth. In many
Optional Protocol is a compromise.”
instances, young boys are forced to
In particular, its effectiveness suffers
choose between imprisonment and
from vagueness. For instance, Artimilitary service. Some children even
cle 1 stipulates that states “shall take all feasible measures to
voluntarily join opposition groups in hopes of avenging past
ensure that members of their armed forces who have not
abuses by the Burmese army.
attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hosWith more than 70,000 boys serving in Tatmadaw Kyi,
tilities.” The deliberate vagueness of this provision enables
the government’s army, Burma is estimated to have the
states to determine what constitutes “all feasible measures” and
largest number of child soldiers in the world. Armed oppodefine “direct part in hostilities.” By setting the standards by
sition groups in Burma also recruit child soldiers. The United
which they are judged, states may easily escape the scrutiny
Wa State Army, the largest armed opposition group, utilizes
of the international community. The Optional Protocol also
approximately 2,000 child soldiers.
breaks with standard international norms concerning proBurma’s use of child soldiers is characterized by excessive
tocols. Generally, a country is prohibited from becoming a
brutalization. Should a child be brave enough to refuse enlistparty to a protocol unless it ratifies the parent agreement. The
ment, that child likely is sent to a local army base or recruitOptional Protocol permits states that have not ratified the Conment camp and beaten into submission. Following recruitvention, such as the United States, to ratify the Optional
ment, Burmese child soldiers, some as young as 11, are
Protocol, in turn undermining the spirit of the Convention.
subject to beatings during training, forced to commit human
Although much can be gained by allowing states to commit
rights abuses against civilians, and prohibited from contactthemselves to the Optional Protocol even where such states
ing their families. Further, children face severe reprisals if they
are unwilling to accept all of the terms of the Convention,
attempt escape.
some argue this loophole effectively diminishes the signifiA primary source of recruits is the Ye Nyunt system, or
cance of the Convention.
“Brave Scouts.” Boys as young as seven engage in military
Further, the Optional Protocol is not comprehensive in its
training at the Ye Nyunt camps and are later transferred to Su
approach to tackling the employment of young children in
Saun Yay recruit holding camps. All recruits entering the govarmed conflict. For example, the Optional Protocol fails to
ernment army first endure brutalization and isolation in the
adequately address the issue of voluntary recruitment of chil-

continued on next page
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National law and policies perpetuate the mobilization of
Iraq’s children. Article 1 of the Iraqi Constitution states that
“[t]he defence of the homeland is a sacred duty and honour
Su Saun Yay camps. Young recruits performing training exerfor citizens.” The 1969 Military Service Act sets the minicises are routinely beaten, sometimes to the point of unconmum age for compulsory recruitment at eighteen. It is unclear
sciousness. The brutalization continues at one of twenty forwhat the minimum age for voluntary recruitment is; sources
mal military training camps. As with initial recruitment, escape
such as the Center for Defense Information indicate it may
is severely punished. The most common punishment entails
be as young as fifteen. In fact, the Revolutionary Command
forcing the entire group of trainees, often numbering more
Council is authorized to determine whom it may conscript durthan two hundred, to line up and beat the escapee. The bruing wartime.
talization continues even after deployment as these Burmese
Supplementing national law and policies that permit trachild soldiers are forced to carry out brutal acts. Although some
ditional recruiting and conscription, military training schools
opposition groups have begun to respond to international presand military youth organizations are predominantly responsure by reducing the recruitment and deployment of child solsible for the mobilization of Iraq’s children. A host of milidiers, the SPDC and the United Wa State Army continue to
tary training programs and youth organizations were launched
ignore such pressure. In fact, the SPDC adamantly denies
following the Gulf War. For instance, in 1998 the Iraqi govthat it has even recruited and deployed children.
ernment initiated a military-preparedness project designed
Burma’s use of child soldiers vioto equip all Iraqi citizens between
lates its domestic law as well as its
the ages of 15 and 65 with basic selfcommitments under the Convention,
defense and small arms training. The
Recruiting and training children,
which Burma ratified in August 1991.
government also developed military
and perhaps most importantly,
Notably, Burma has not ratified the
training camps for children between
indoctrinating their impressionable
Optional Protocol. Even if Burma
12 and 17. These military camps have
were to ratify the Optional Protocol,
trained more than 23,000 children in
minds with extremist ideology, enables
its effectiveness is dubious. Among
the usage of light arms and Ba’ath
Saddam Hussein to consolidate his
the flaws Rachel Stohl highlighted,
ideology, which espouses pan-Arahold over the Iraqi people.
the Optional Protocol fails to adebism, socialism, and resistance to forquately address voluntary recruitment
eign interference. Political scientists
of children 18 and under. Thus, the
have even likened Ba’ath ideology
Optional Protocol would be powerless with respect to the
to European fascism. Additionally, numerous military youth
scores of children that voluntarily join the Burmese governgroups are employed to train Iraq’s youth. The Ashbal Sadment army or non-state armed groups. Additionally, the
dam, or Saddam Lion Cubs, with members as young as ten,
dearth of monitoring, verification, and implementation
is but one organization whose training includes the use of
provisions impedes the Optional Protocol’s potential effecsmall arms, hand-to-hand combat, and infantry tactics. The
tiveness, particularly in a situation such as that in Burma
U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report on Iraq notes
where the key players consistently refute their utilization of
that families who do not enroll their children in these prochild soldiers.
grams face sanctions, such as the loss of their food ration cards.
Because sanctions are imposed for failure to enroll, enrollment is not functionally voluntary. The report also noted that
The Role of the Optional Protocol in New Conflicts: Iraq
the failure to register children in the Fedyayeen Saddam, or
The Optional Protocol may potentially play a role in the proSaddam’s Martyrs, generally results in the denial of school
tection of children before conflict emerges as illustrated by the
examination results. The Fedyayeen Saddam reportedly is
war in Iraq. International attention focuses almost exclusively
comprised entirely of children, numbering between 18,000
on Saddam Hussein’s development of weapons of mass destrucand 40,000 troops.
tion. With international scrutiny centered on the threat of
The near certainty that Saddam Hussein will deploy chilchemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein’s regime
dren makes it incumbent upon the international community
deliberately recruits children into its armed forces with
to address the use of child soldiers. Presented with this disimpunity. With the onset of the war with Iraq, the international
turbing reality, the shortcomings of international instrucommunity must address the ineluctable fact that war will
ments such as the Optional Protocol are evident. Iraq has neialmost certainly entail combat with children. The Iran-Iraq War
ther signed the instrument nor taken any steps toward
and the Gulf War are instructive because reports suggest that
preventing the use of children in armed combat or limiting
children fought among Iraqi forces during both conflicts.
their participation in military training programs. In fact, it is
The Iraqi regime has been training children as young as
conceivable that Iraq’s utilization of child soldiers will only
ten years old since the mid-1990s. Peter Singer, an analyst with
increase as the war unfolds. Yet as reported in the Independent,
the Brookings Institution, recently reported that Baghdad is
among other sources, it appears the Pentagon has not explichome to nearly 8,000 child soldiers. As Singer explains, “A
itly prepared for facing child soldiers in combat. Given the
common means for totalitarian regimes to maintain control
psychological trauma that accompanies military combat with
is to set their country on a constant war footing and militachildren, as well as the public relations debacle that inevitably
rize society.” Recruiting and training children, and perhaps
will ensue, it is shocking that American forces did not address
most importantly, indoctrinating their impressionable minds
the issue before troops were deployed. Lacking such prewith extremist ideology, enables Saddam Hussein to consolparedness, the United States will find itself in a precarious posiidate his hold over the Iraqi people. These were the tactics
tion: the United States must condemn the use of child soldiers
Nazi Germany employed to a frighteningly effective degree.
as a violation of international law yet remain vigilant against
Comparing Iraqi child soldiers with Hitler Youth, Singer
the threat they pose.
noted that Iraqi child soldiers could similarly “operate with
unexpected and terrifying audacity.”
continued on next page
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As war with Iraq demonstrates, the usefulness of the
Optional Protocol is undermined when rogue states are at
issue. Iraqi law and policies controvert the standards enumerated in the Optional Protocol and conflict with a developing international consensus opposed to the recruitment and
deployment of children under 18. Because Iraq is not obligated to abide by the Optional Protocol, a concerted campaign
of international pressure may, therefore, be the most effective tool for protecting Iraqi children.

child recruitment, implementation of demobilization and
rehabilitation programming, and prosecution of those who
recruit and deploy child soldiers. 
* Shara Abraham is a 2002 graduate of the Washington College
of Law and a staff attorney with the Prison Reform Advocacy Center.
** This article was drafted in anticipation of the war in Iraq and
does not take into account the recent events in the region.

Conclusion
The development of international norms and standards
concerning the involvement of children in armed conflict is
significant. In particular, the widespread acceptance of the
Optional Protocol is cause for optimism. Precarious peace
processes, protracted conflicts, and the threat of new conflicts
nonetheless demand a vigilant and concerted commitment
from the international community. Such conflicts also illustrate the shortcomings of the Optional Protocol. Buttressed
by mechanisms for implementing, reporting, and monitoring, as well as a more explicit declaration concerning voluntary
recruitment, the Optional Protocol could be employed more
effectively to protect children affected by armed conflict.
International condemnation of the use of child soldiers warrants a strengthened Optional Protocol with a capacity for
comprehensive protection of children from conflict. Yet
given the Optional Protocol’s limitations, ending the
deplorable practice of child soldiers requires a multi-faceted
approach. Such an approach should include application of
internal and international pressure, reduction of the risk of
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the Inter-American Court every year. It exemplifies the extent
to which human rights abuses occur in the Americas and
evidences the potential for the inter-American system to play
a definitive role in removing the shield of impunity for those
who plan and carry out such abuses.
A decision in favor of Guatemala would set a precedent that
limits the extent to which the Inter-American Court can
exercise its jurisdiction to evaluate the efficacy of domestic
systems of justice in addressing violations of fundamental
human rights.
Indeed, the convictions of one of the individuals suspected
of carrying out Myrna’s assassination and one of the three
accused of planning the crime were important triumphs in
Helen Mack’s endeavor to seek justice on her sister’s behalf.
In light of such achievements, the Court could choose to construe strictly the requirement of exhausting domestic remedies
and refuse to find the state in violation of the Convention where
it had made progress in the pursuit of justice.
If the Inter-American Court decides the case in favor of the
petitioners, the decision would add force to the existing
jurisprudence that recognizes the Court’s jurisdiction over

cases pending in domestic fora when such domestic proceedings have been unreasonably delayed or ineffectively
prosecuted. Specifically, this decision would establish the
precedent that although prosecution and conviction of some
state actors responsible for planning or executing human
rights violations are important steps toward fulfilling a state’s
international legal duties, they are insufficient when others
who shared responsibility for such violations continue to
enjoy impunity. Finally, such a decision would underscore
states’ institutional responsibility for state actors who are
involved, at all levels, in planning or carrying out human rights
violations. 
*David Baluarte is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and an articles editor for the Human Rights Brief. Erin
Chlopak is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law. The
authors were part of a student group invited to participate in the hearings by WCL Dean Claudio Grossman, former president of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and Commission delegate
to the Court for Myrna Mack v. Guatemala. This article represents
the opinions of the authors, and not necessarily those of the IACHR
or the OAS.
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